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** Background **

The ongoing efforts by some to sue former Sacramento Mayor Ikenstein for his alleged embezzlement of local government funds is unlikely to bear fruit anytime soon. Indeed, if it succeeds, it will have to be despite, not because, of the system of laws established in the eUSA's Constitution.

The problems with Article II of the [a url=http://wiki.erepublik.com/index.php/Constitution_of_USA]eUSA Constitution[/a] are three-fold. First, the prosecution of a civil claim is indeterminate. Second, the right to a jury trial is indeterminate. And third, the selection of judicial officers is indeterminate.

In this first of a three part series, we will examine the failure to provide for suits against government officials for malfeasance in office, and its wider implications for eMerica.

** Analysis **

Article II, Section 1, defines Sacramento (and most other regions) as seperate "Judicial Entities." In doing so, it fails to make clear the procedural establishment of the Courts for the District of Sacramento. The term "Representative of the Judicial Entity" is first used and defined here, but only in reference to multi-regional "Judicial Entities." The term, however, is important in the construction of the language of Article II, Section 2.

In Section 1, multi-region districts are created by the President's discretion (an arbitrary and flawed, but at least clear, procedure), and the Mayors of the various combined regions are to select amongst themselves a single Representative - with the President selecting if the Mayors are unable to do so. The President, therefore, is given wide-ranging powers to shape justice. He may create the multi-region districts in any way he sees fit, and arguably may appoint any Mayor to head such a district, so long as at least one Mayor is obstinate about refusing to agree to the identity of the representative.

These flaws pale, in comparison to single-region Judicial Entities like Sacramento. No provision whatsoever is made for the selection of the "Representative" in these cases.

But let us assume without deciding that the Mayor of a single-region judicial entity can simply "reach concensus with himself" and appoint himself representative, for now. The problem is, after all, moot for the time being, as there will be no Mayors by this time next month.

The real problem is in Section 2. In any civil infraction, the Mayor must appoint the prosecuting attorney. No provision is made for the case where the Mayor is, himself, the defendant. See Section 2a. Nothing prevents such a Mayor, therefore, from appointing himself as prosecutor, and then dismissing the case, despite the egregious conflict of interest involved.

In a federal case (which all cases must be after the end of local government), the President selects a "Federal Officer" who then selects the prosecuting attorney. This is an improvement only in the sense that only the President himself remains immune from suit by operation of the power to select the prosecutor.


The failure of Article II to provide for suits not brought BY the Government, but instead brought AGAINST officials of the Government, ultimately renders the Constitution itself toothless. When no citizen can complain that the government is itself breaking the law, the entire system of laws, and not merely the judicial branch, is fatally undermined.

I do not suggest that people should be privileged to sue the Government for any reason or no reason. However, the individual members of the government can and should be accountable for any actions they take which would violate the law. This is particularly important with the President, and Congress, and therefore has not become moot merely because the Mayors are a dying breed.