Big Boys Games - Deterrence [Ministerul Media]

Day 362, 17:00 Published in Romania Romania by Ministerul Media

This article represents a proposal for the Romanian Military Doctrine, based on the deterrence theory. As a legitimate national security option, the deterrence doctrine will mark new standards in the engagement level and will contribute to the redefining of the power games in the New World.

1. What is Deterrence Theory?

Deterrence, by definition, is a strategy by which governments threaten an immense retaliation if attacked, such that aggressors are deterred if they do not wish to suffer great damage as a result of an aggressive action.

Deterrence affects both emotions and the rationale of the enemy and can be used only in highly customized manner, on each aggressor and its respective leadership. Fear is not the possession of the rational mind alone. Deterrence is thus a form of bargaining which exploits a capability for inflicting damage at such a level as to truly cause hurt far greater than just military defeat.

Aggressors are deterred if they choose not to act, perceiving the cost of their action to be too high in relation to its likely success. Deterrence must create fear in the mind of the adversary - fear that he will not achieve his objectives, fear that his losses and humiliation will far outweigh any potential gain, fear that he will be punished.

In this regard, deterrence is a defensive strategy, not an offensive one.

2. Knowing values and communicating them

We should inaugurate the deterrence process by first considering the value of the eRomanian interests that are, or may be, threatened. In this regard, we must communicate, specifically, what we want to deter, without saying what is permitted.

We must know our enemies and we must learn in advance what they value most, and we must adapt to each hostile leadership. No single method can describe the best way to introduce fear in the mind of an adversary. Similarly, the personal characteristics of eRomanian leaders will be variables that will affect how, or weather, an adversary's leaders are apt to believe the stated deterrent threat. Different leaders will be motivated in different ways.

It will be important to frequently communicate with the adversary, so that there is little room for doubt as to for what eRomania holds of sufficient value that we seek to deter attack against it, and for which we are willing to greatly escalate the level of conflict.

Critical inputs from eRomanian intelligence are, of course of vital importance, but this is not a deterrence-related element, at it is vital to any other military doctrine.

3. Keeping our options open and our determination clear

We should always have available the full range of responses, including but not limited to declaring war, supporting or starting FFFs, launching surprise tank attacks, long-term erosion wars, political takeovers, media disruptions, attacks on the monetary market, attacks on the national currencies or commodities markets, disruption of the human resources markets and others. All this options must be a component of the eRomanian war arsenal and available to the eRomanian leadership.

We must be ambiguous about specific details of our response or preemption if what we value is threatened, but it must be clear that our actions would have terrible consequences for our aggressor. It hurts to portray ourselves as too fully rational and cool-headed. The fact that some elements may appear to be potentially "out of control" can be beneficial in creating and reenforcing fears and doubts within the minds of an adversary's decision makers. That eRomania may become irrational and vindictive if its vital interests are attacked should be a part of the national persona we project to all adversaries.

We must have the national will and actual capability to carry out our response in order for the deterrence to be effective. We should at all times keep the necessary means of projecting power in any specific manner which may cause the necessary damage (military, economic, political or social) in order to deter an enemy attack. And, whenever deterrence might be ineffective, we shall act upon our threats, in order to reinforce deterrence of future menaces.

We have to be ready to do terrible things, if we cherish our peace.

In the New World, as in RL, security is not constructed upon reputation, but upon fear of retaliation.

I will be glad to read your feedback.

Yours,
dsalageanu
Lieutenant-Commander, Homeland Hawks Military Unit
President of the eRomania United Party