War & Diplomacy: The Future

Day 2,205, 11:04 • Published in Ireland Ireland • by Brian Boru


The changes in eRepublik recently have greatly changed things for the relationship between small countries and large countries, as well as alliances and their strategic allies.



Determination and small countries' role:
For years, a small country has had little part to play in the global geopolitics of the world in general. Exceptions have arisen in some numbers however. Ireland was once one of them, being extremely optimised for war. Other countries were useful for their strategic positions, resources, diplomatic clout or cheap airstrikes. Before the advent of the resistance war function, being a small country was a literally dance on the edge of the cliff, utterly at the mercy of the superpowers around. With the addition of Determination to the game, the role has utterly reversed, and now smaller military powers could be of key importance to international alliance politics.



Fabian Strategy:
The practical effect of the changes is twofol😛

Firstly, the strategic consequences of the change so far, i.e. the use of resistance wars as a strategic weapon that alliances can make use of, rather than just a distraction or national liberation tool. With damage mulpliers, small countries can fight effective battles against larger ones. The money and damage required to put down resistance wars is correspondingly increased. This allows alliances to include highly aggressive small countries as battering rams: First with MPPs and airstrikes, then with highly coordinated Resistance wars aided greatly by determination. This benefits both sides, as small countries can fight effectively for both their existence and their place at the international table, and large countries gain a highly effective manner of disrupting their enemies' economic and military arrangements.

The second practical effect of the change is diplomatic in nature: Rental agreements and treaties of occupation are now much harder to enforce. Rentals can now be very much a strategic negative for countries, only to be weighed against the benefit of the resources gained as a result, and even then must be considered very temporary arrangements. Treaties between occupied countries and occupier countries are effectively redundant in the long term as well, as determination makes long term occupation both impossible to enforce and places a moral imperative on national governments to at least try to fight at some point. The tax changes also place an economic imperative to resist, as taxes are sucked away or lowered.

The world largely conforms to old thinking on these points: some countries continue to pursue rentals as a means of gaining resources, whereas some smaller countries continue to make highly unequal treaties with countries they could utterly confound with the right mix of strategy and time.

Occupation by the enemy is no longer something to be feared in the long term, even less so over long distances.



Countermeasures:
Of course, larger countries are not without options to counter the changes. The objective for large countries must now be to hold the maximum number of resources with the minimum amount of regions and expenses. That is a feasible objective in practical terms, though there comes a political problem in that the huge empires of the last era are no longer sustainable. Pride may insure that large empires overreach just as fear continues to insure that small countries remain more or less subdued.

More unusual countermeasures are more expensive. Large countries initiating resistance wars themselves every now and again would require them to turn away from some of their alliance engagements to insure they won the RW battles in question, and would cost significant amounts of money with the added possibility of losing.

Poland's recent treaty with Germany is perhaps the first example of an attempt to deal with determination on a strategic level, as it engineers two routes by which Poland may use to get to France without resistance from Germany. However, the agreement is highly dependent on a subdued Germany that doesn't resist: the alternative full scale occupation of Germany would be very costly for Poland in the long term, and it has already been demonstrated to be a failed concept. Add in the strategic interests of Poland's enemies, and the Polish-German Treaty looks like utter surrender on the part of the Germans for no conceivable strategic reason in the long term.



Alliances and the Guerrilla War:
It will take courage and sacrifice on their part, but small countries can now play a bigger role in the game. The larger powers would be wise to take note of the potential of this renewed form of war, and the governments of small countries would be wise to steel themselves against cowardice.

Small countries can no longer afford to be idle as the game population drops. Even if you believe small countries cannot take a successful stand, lack of activity will kill them off anyway. Is it not better to die on one's feet than one's knees? Plato has given us the perfect opportunity, let's take it!



TLDR:
- Determination multiplies the damage value of small countries at a strategic level
- Small countries can now be of great strategic importance to alliances if they're willing to be aggressive and risk occupations
- Rental agreements and long term occupations of huge numbers of regions are now unsustainable and grow more unsustainable over time
- We'll all die of inactivity instead of foreign occupation if we do nothing but vassalise ourselves to the major powers